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IN DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT AGAINST
TRUTHMAKER MAXIMALISM
Abstract. The paper analyses the argument proposed by Milne (2005)
against truthmaker maximalism and shows that the objections raised to
this argument by de Sa and Zardini, and Rodriguez-Pereyra are misguided
because the first one misuses the vagueness of some terms; and the sec-
ond one is based on a fallacy of petitio principii (this is exactly the same
type of objection as it was raised by Rodriguez-Pereyra against the Milne’s
argument).1
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It seems that whatever we claim to be true has to be in some way an-
chored in reality. Truthmaker theorists take this as claiming that every
truth have something that makes it true, that is a truthmaker. For
example, Armstrong wrote:
I hold the view that every truth has a truthmaker. The truthmaker
for a particular truth is that object or entity in the world in virtue of
which that truth is true. [. . . ] The truthmaker is the “correspondent”
in the Correspondence theory of truth, but with the repudiation of the
view that the correspondence involved is always one-one.
(Armstrong, 2000, p. 150)
1 This argument, firstly presented by Milne (2005), was independently discovered
by the author of this paper in December of 2010 and introduced in the paper “Does
every truth need a truthmaker?” (unpublished).
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A difficult problem which remains for the truthmaker theorists, however,
is to show that all truths do really have truthmakers. Milne (2005) ar-
gued that at least some truths do not have truthmakers and I would
like to show that the objections raised against his reasoning by de Sa
and Zardini, and Rodriguez-Pereyra are misguided. In the case of the
argument of de Sa and Zardini, my paper can be seen as an implementa-
tion of the general strategy proposed by Armour-Garb and Woodbridge
(2010, p. 11) intended to show that de Sa and Zardini’s “arguments fail
to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they
fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they
misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show.”2
The truthmaker theory which appeared in the quotation from Arm-
strong  truthmaker maximalism TM  can be stated in the form:
TM Every true sentence has at least one truthmaker.
What Milne (2005) aimed to show, is that TM is false. For if we take
into account the sentence M which is similar to the Gödel sentence:
M This sentence has no truthmaker.
it is easy to see that this sentence cannot have a truthmaker because oth-
erwise it would be a true sentence which is self-contradictory. Hence, by
reductio ad absurdum, M has no truthmaker. But if the sentence M does
not have truthmaker and it says about itself that it has no truthmaker,
it is true and in this way does contradict TM, which means that TM is
false and should be abandoned. What Milne emphasized was that the key
inferential step is a weak form of reductio ad absurdum valid in minimal
logic (and in Priest’s Logic of Paradox) and that M engenders no outright
inconsistency (see (Milne, 2005, p. 222), (Milne, 2013, pp. 475–476) and
(Priest, 1979)). The last point is important because  as Milne noted—
“the truthmaker theorist might try to chisel apart [G]ödel sentences and
M, and try to assimilate M to the Liar Paradox” (Milne, 2005, p. 222).
As a matter of fact, Milne’s opponents López de Sa and Zardini (2006),
and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) applied this very strategy.
López de Sa and Zardini attempted to show that “the same form
of argument [as Milne’s argument] could be used to establish (the nega-
tion of) just about anything you please” (López de Sa and Zardini, 2006,
p. 154). Their argument is based on the following sentence:
2 Unlike the author of this paper, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2010, p. 22)
are convinced by Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (2006) argument against Milne’s position.
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S This sentence is not both true and short.
The authors claim that arguing in a way “similar” to Milne it can be
easily “proved” that S is not short:
Suppose that S is both true and short. Then it is true. So what it says
is the case is the case. Hence S is not both true and short. On the
supposition that S is both true and short, it is not both true and short.
By reductio ad absurdum, S is not both true and short. But this is just
what S says. Hence S is true. Hence, since it is not both true and
short, it is not short. (López de Sa and Zardini, 2006, pp. 154–155)
[. . . ] that S is not short is inconsistent with the deliverances of our
senses, but, unlike the Liar sentence, S itself gives rise to no inconsis-
tency when treated as an ordinary sentence and subject to the usual
rules of logic. (López de Sa and Zardini, 2006, p. 156)
However, this counterargument is misguided and only misuses the
vagueness of the term ‘short’ (it is not clear whether S should be treated
as short or not); the supposed lack of inconsistency is an effect of this
vagueness and it is easy to demonstrate that if we make this term more
precise, it is impossible “to establish (the negation of) just about any-
thing you please” (López de Sa and Zardini, 2006, p. 154). To show this,
let us assume first that S is short (because we assume, for example, that
‘short’ means ‘consisting of no more than 10 words’). Then, if we assume
that S is both true and short, what it says is true and this means that
it is not both true and short, and we have a contradiction. We obtain
the same result a contradiction if we assume that S is short but not
true, because S says that it is not both true and short and as such should
be true. So, when shortness is truthfully predicated of S (which is an
empirical fact), S becomes logically inconsistent exactly as in the case
of the Liar Sentence because ascribing truth to S leads to its falsity and
ascribing falsity leads to its truth. This would mean contrary to what
is claimed by the authors (López de Sa and Zardini, 2006, p. 156) an
outright inconsistency of S. And needless to say, nothing can be proved
by logically inconsistent sentences.
On the other hand, if S is not short (because we assume, for example,
that ‘short’ means ‘consisting of no more than 5 words’), S is simply true
and does not “establish (the negation of) just about anything you please”
as well.
Because de Sa and Zardini claimed that “the same form of argument
[as Milne’s argument] could be used to establish (the negation of) just
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about anything you please”, I shall try to prove more generally that it
is impossible. To show this, let us replace ‘short’ by F , where ‘F’ is any
predicate you want (for example, ‘consisting of 8 words’; or ‘being the
most important sentence of philosophy’; or ‘being a flying hippo’):
S′ This sentence is not both true and F .
We have now again two cases: F can be truthfully predicated of S′, or
not. In the first case, S′ becomes logically inconsistent exactly as in
the previous example of ‘consisting of no more than 10 words’ and as
in the case of the Liar Sentence, which would mean again its outright
inconsistency. But if S′ is not F , S′ is again simply true (exactly as in
the previous example of ‘consisting of no more than 5 words’) and does
not ‘establish (the negation of) just about anything you please’ as well.
It follows from these considerations that sentences of the type of S
cannot be used against Milne’s argument since they either lead to con-
tradiction or simply are true sentences. The first result in not surprising,
because the sentences of the type of S confuse object-language and met-
alanguage assigning truth-value to themselves, which results in similar
consequences to the case of the Liar Sentence. Unlike S, the sentence
M, which is used in Milne’s argument, does not assign a truth-value to
itself and is not logically inconsistent.
Milne’s argument was also criticized by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006),
who tried to show that Milne begs the question against truthmaker max-
imalism TM because if we assume TM, then M is assimilable to the Liar
Paradox and as such is logically inconsistent. It is, however, Rodriguez-
Pereyra and not Milne, who made the classical petitio principii fallacy;
the sentence M is, to all appearances, meaningful, like Gödel sentences
(Milne, 2005, p. 222), and is true simply because it does not have any
truthmaker, and this is exactly what this sentence states without logical
inconsistency.3 As I mentioned before, Milne suggested that the truth-
maker theorist might try to employ strategy of chiseling apart M and
Gödel sentence and assimilating M to the Liar Paradox (Milne, 2005,
p. 222), and this is just the strategy which was used by Rodriguez-
Pereyra. But it is obvious that this cannot be done on the basis of TM
because it would lead to a fallacy of petitio principii in the case when
TM is under discussion. Unfortunately, Rodriguez-Pereyra comitted
3 In the recently published paper, Milne tries to show that his argument is es-
sentially object level, not at all semantic (Milne, 2013, p. 373–374).
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this fallacy when he assumes that M is paradoxical as the Liar because
TM makes the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘has a truthmaker’ equivalent
(Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2006, p. 261). With the same effect, Rodriguez-
Pereyra could try to show, for example, that the theory of relativity is
incorrect because if we assume Newtonian physics, the theory of rela-
tivity leads to contradictions (e.g. masses of particles are constant as
in Newtonian physics and are not constant when their velocities are
changing as in the theory of relativity).
There is no symmetry between M and TM ; the fundamental differ-
ence between them is that, in contrast to M, the sentence TM is not
true in virtue of what this sentence states.
I conclude that Milne’s argument has not been proven false-not by
the analyzed counterarguments, anyway.
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